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INTERNATIONES

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On the Concept of Knowledge in the Criticism of Political Economy

A century after the publication of the first volume of Marx's *Kapital* the difficulties of judging this work adequately have by no means decreased; on the contrary, they have rather increased. In his postscript to the second edition Marx complains about frequent misunderstandings of his method. Since then, the situation has, however, further deteriorated. Apart from obstacles of a non-theoretical nature and coarsely material and political interests, both of which are still as effective as in Marx's day and which hamper if not obviate a serious reception of the economical side of Marxism in the bourgeois world, there remains the great embarrassment which Marx's enterprise causes the present sociological mind, dominated as it is by the criteria of "operational" rationality, criteria which are opposed to historical thinking. This is an embarrassment with which those of Marx's contemporaries who were unfamiliar with dialectical thinking were also unable to cope; they discussed whether Marx's method in *Das Kapital* had been positivistic or metaphysical, analytic or synthetic, inductive or deductive. Materialistic dialectics, however, do not lend themselves to such inner-philosophical alternatives, nor to the traditional categories belonging to systems and theories of science. They resist description in terms of a contrast between natural sciences and the humanities, which, by the neo-Kantians (Windelband-Rickert) has been formulated as the contrast be-

tween the "nomothetical" and "idiographical", or the "generalizing" and the "individualizing" methods. Diltney's¹⁵⁶ distinction between the disciplines that "explain" the objects of their study (the natural sciences) and those that "understand" them (the humanities) is just as incapable of grasping materialistic dialectics as the dogmatic division between "historical" and "systematic" points of view is. Marx's teaching is neither a special science dealing with economy, politics or history (or a combination of these), nor is it philosophy (or anthropology) in the speculative-idealist sense. We do not even find the term "sociology" in his works, although it was quite common in his day¹⁵⁷. For Marx there are no social facts in themselves that can be examined apart from the context of the natural, historico-economical, psychological and political destiny of man. Yet, *Das Kapital* remains a work of learned research with a decisive claim to *theoretical* relevance. Although his concept of science is closely linked with the idea of a revolutionary changing of the world, Marx nevertheless does not consider thought an agitatory instrument to be used in the service of some desired goal. "My word for a man who tries to accommodate science to a standpoint derived not from within that science (however erroneous it may be), but from interests *outside* it and *alien* to it, is 'mean',"¹⁵⁸ he says in *Theories of Surplus Value*, in a passage about Malthus¹⁵⁹. *Das Kapital*, far from being a call to hasty action, is the most thorough and comprehensive attempt made for some time "to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society", in other words to view "the evolution of the economic formation of society . . . as a process of natural history"¹⁶⁰.

Once one has acknowledged the fact that the difficulty of defining the position among sciences of materialistic dialectics is unavoidable because it has its roots in fact, then the difficulty has, at least in principle, been overcome. The moment one realizes that Marx's most important results were achieved precisely because he "saw through" the ideological function of the limits between disciplines – this function being merely to distract attention from the real object of knowledge, which is the social phenomenon as a whole, then one is no longer tempted to reduce the contents of *Das Kapital* to the questions of an established social science or to distribute them, in the way Schumpeter¹⁶¹ still does, among the spheres of "prophecy", "philosophy", "sociology" and "national economy". Bearing in mind the short space at our disposal we can only aim at outlining some of the main characteristics of the concepts of knowledge and science presupposed by *Das Kapital*. More detailed investigations must be left to future discussion.

It seems necessary today to start with a few remarks concerning the method of Marx interpretation:

1. Important as Marx's understanding of his own works may be, it often lags far behind what Marx offers in the way of theories in his material analyses¹⁶². It is therefore not a sign of orthodoxy if one goes by his famous prefaces and postscripts which – if isolated from the various oppositions and processes of thought whose results they are – favour incorrect interpretations. It only needs a reminder of Marx's completely misleading phrase that in the chapter on the theory of value he occasionally "flirted" with Hegel's peculiar way of expressing himself¹⁶³. The truth is that the methodical structure of his work is based on a second study of Hegel's *Logic*, setting in in the late 1850's, which acquired the same importance for his economic analysis as the concept of work expounded in *The Phenomenology of Mind* did for his "understanding of himself" immediately prior to the revolution of 1848¹⁶⁴.

2. Any modern exegesis of Marx has to proceed in two stages. First of all it must make it clear what is really contained in the texts. This demand is by no means banal, considering the numerous books in which theses are being defended that were never put forward by Marx. It may be that our modern interest contributes considerably to the weight we give to the question of the "authentic" Marx – yet it is necessary at the outset to open up the sources which are accessible only with difficulty, among them the letters, the *Theories of Surplus Value* and, especially, the voluminous "rough draft" of 1857–59, which was published under the title of *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*. A number of the questions that have quite unnecessarily weighed on the Marx discussion of the past, can be explained by merely philological means. In addition to this – and this would have to be the second stage of procedure – there are problems that only become apparent, if we go beyond a mere interpretation of the actual wording and venture into "constructing". Only thus is it possible to deal adequately with the question of the present-day significance of Marx's theorems.

3. As for the method of looking at Marx's life-work itself we must follow his own principle of explaining the anatomy of the ape by means of that of man and not the other way round. The early writings of Marx and Engels, which for a long time were considered to contain the Marxist philosophico-humanist content proper, can only be fully understood by a historico-economic analysis of *Das Kapital*. This is, above all, true of historical materialism. In its essence (*an sich*) it is given in *Holy Family*, *German Ideology*, *The Poverty of Philosophy* and in the *Communist Manifesto*. Furthermore Marx wrote the famous preface to his *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* of 1859¹⁶⁵. Yet, he who wants to understand the prima-

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→ rily critical meaning of this theory, has to resort to *Das Kapital*. Only here does it become clear that the rash opinion of historical materialism being "one-sided" cannot be defeated by saying that Marx and Engels recognized not only economical but other – so-called spiritual – elements as making history; but the one way to do this is to take up this reproach and hold it against the conditions analysed by Marx. As for the one-sidedness deplored by idealists as "economism", an investigation into *Das Kapital* shows that it is actually an abstraction carried out not by the theoretician but day by day by social reality. With the growth of the world of commodities, i.e. the "general form of value" of the products of labour, the abstract and general character of human labour becomes also a social characteristics.

Let us now turn to Marx's real intention: the criticism of political economy. He takes it in a double meaning. First, as a criticism of real, politico-economic conditions as they necessarily arise from capitalist forms of production and distribution, and secondly, as a criticism of political economy as the science comprising the total life process – *le monde moral*, as the 18th century says – the science, within which the theoretical understanding which the bourgeois society had of itself found its most adequate expression.

→ The immediate object of Marx's investigations, it is true, is the empirically given conditions of production. But – and this Marx emphasizes in a letter to Lassalle¹⁶⁶ – it is impossible to master this immediate object in a direct way. On the contrary, the factual "system of bourgeois economy" is grasped by means of a "criticism of bourgeois categories", as they have historically appeared. In this respect Marx's criticism of capitalism is largely a criticism of theories. Marx follows the course of capitalist production by means of an analysis of the literary development from William Petty¹⁶⁷ to David Ricardo¹⁶⁸. By sticking closely to the theoretical premises of bourgeois economy, he reveals the contradictions between these premises and social reality (as thought) and thereby the objective contradictions within social reality itself. Thus Marx by no means maintains that dialectics are an "ontological" phenomenon. It is true that they are not only immanent to the process of recognition but also always to the real object. But this object is nothing outside the concepts grasping it, without however, as in Hegel, being nothing but these. We should not suppress the fact either that the object of Marx's "criticism" is only indirectly given by the theory and its historical interests, or that the object is indirectly given in itself, and it is this that makes the theory into an objective one.

→ Although Marx, as Hegel's disciple, refuses to deal in an "abstract" way with the "theory of theory" and to introduce the development of his ideas by long-winded definitions and considerations of a methodological and epi-

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stemological nature¹⁶⁹, yet greater importance is attributed with him to the subjective-human, not to say instrumental side of knowledge than in Hegel's *Logic*, for which the method is the form in which the absolute itself moves and in which the total sequence of categories is identical with the eternal object. With Marx, however, the categories are finite, transient products, "theoretical expressions, ... abstractions of social conditions of production"¹⁷⁰.]

The theory and its objective contents remain reciprocally related without ever becoming one and the same. For this reason Marx stresses that the method of inquiry must "formally" be different from that of presentation.]

Considered in isolation, this is a materialist principle that can also be found in Hegel, although not in those of his works in which the speculative mind or concept is "with itself" and lives, as it were, of its own substance. But it can be found in the *Naturphilosophie* and in the *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, that is in those works in which the identity of subject and object is less clear, in which a material analysed by the understanding can be transformed into "attributes of reason", a process which it, at first, resists. "This process of the origination of science is different from its process in itself when it is complete, just as is the process of the history of Philosophy and that of Philosophy itself . . .; the working out of the empirical side has really become the conditioning of the Idea, so that this last may reach its full development and determination."¹⁷¹ And Marx writes in his postscript to the second edition of *Das Kapital*: "The latter (inquiry) has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development, to trace out their inner connection. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be adequately described. If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had before us a mere a priori construction."¹⁷² At the present position of international discussion¹⁷³ there can no longer be any doubt about it that the accurate understanding of Marx's method in *Das Kapital* stands or falls by the concept of "presentation". This is perhaps first mentioned by the authors in *German Ideology*. Even here the aim is to order a material prepared somewhere else, to structure it in a second process of reflexion¹⁷⁴. It is only this reflexion that unfolds the "object in its totality"¹⁷⁵. The "inquiry" about which Marx talks in *Das Kapital*, is confronted with a huge mass of material from the fields of the history of economy and sociology, sociography, statistics and others of a similar nature. Its method, to put it in a Hegelian way, is that of the "isolating" and analysing understanding. "Presentation", on the other hand, has to bring "concrete" unity to these isolated data. It reproduces the living whole, which appears in a one-sided form only

in the products of individual sciences and is never really comprehended by them. They do "nothing but supply the elements for the theoretical construction of the temporal course of history, and these in presentation do not remain what they were in individual sciences, but are invested with new functions of meaning that formerly had not been considered"¹⁷⁶. This is particularly true of classical bourgeois economy, which Marx does use as a starting-point but only renders capable of presentation by means of criticism¹⁷⁷. "Economy as a science in the German sense" (what he means is, in the sense of corrected Hegelianism) has still "to be made"¹⁷⁸. Marx describes his task in the following way: "The job that has to be . . . done is a criticism of economical categories or . . . the system of bourgeois economy presented critically. It is at the same time a presentation of the system and by means of this presentation a criticism of the same."¹⁷⁹

All this should make it clear how important the question of presentation is for Marx's conception. It has so far hardly been paid adequate attention to — except for Horkheimer's¹⁸⁰ essays written in the 1930's. It was either understood in a literary sense, which made dialectics with Marx a mere stylistic means, or it was said that Marx chose a dialectical form of presentation on the grounds of external efficiency, so that today he might choose a different one. If bourgeois economists take Marx at all seriously, they consider it perfectly possible to discuss the problems of *Das Kapital*, insofar as history has not already disposed of them, without the Hegelian-dialectical "ballast". If, however, dialectical categories are being translated into operational terminology, they lose their element of the "negatively reasonable", which according to Hegel is their most significant characteristic. The comprehended whole is replaced by (badly subjective) connections of reflection. Presentation, however, is not superadded to the material as an external element. By revealing the historical dynamics of the material it becomes the real act of recognition and is the medium in which the critical-dialectical theory exists: "analysis" in a higher sense.

As a logical construction presentation by no means simply follows the course of history. On the contrary, as Marx explains in the chapter on commodities and money, it "takes a course directly opposite to that of their actual historical development". It starts with the completed results of the process of development: "The characters that stamp products as commodities, and whose establishment is a necessary preliminary to the circulation of commodities, have already acquired the stability of natural, self-understood forms of social life, before man seeks to decipher, not their historical character, for in his eyes they are immutable, but their meaning. Consequently it was the analysis of the prices of commodities that alone led

to the determination of the magnitude of value, and it was the common expression of all commodities in money that alone led to the establishment of their characters as values. It is, however, just this ultimate money form of the world of commodities that actually conceals, instead of disclosing, the social character of private labour, and the social relations between the individual producers."¹⁸¹ This explains why Marx began his studies by examining the material provided by literary history, which appeared under the title of *Theories of Surplus Value* and were to make up the fourth volume of *Das Kapital*, while the part he worked on last, namely volume I, was published first.

While "inquiry" follows the actual course of bourgeois history, "presentation" chooses the opposite direction: it proceeds from immediate "being" to mediating "essence", i. e. it goes back, in the Hegelian sense, from being to essence, which is the ground of being. In other words, Marx invests with life the past historical process whose sediments are the consolidated concepts of (empirically ^{de-facto} biased) bourgeois economy. It is for this reason that Lefèbvre¹⁸² in his analyses of agrarian society and, following his example, Sartre, talk of a "progressive-regressive" method used by Marx. It is only in the 24th chapter, dealing with the centuries of "original accumulation", that Marx discusses the historical presuppositions of what has already been constitutive for the concept of the product and its analysis (as well as for everything resulting from this).

The structure of *Das Kapital*, which is the result of Marx's method of leading from the product to the complete concept of capital (his "total process"), rests on the idea that essential reality must be distinguished from the reality of appearance. Hegel too expressed by the phrase that all things have an essence, that they are not what they appear to be. "If the form of appearance and the essence of things were directly identical", Marx says, "all science would be superfluous . . ." ^{de-facto}¹⁸³. And similarly in a different place: "It is an achievement of science to reduce the visible, merely apparent movement to the inner real movement . . ." ^{de-facto}¹⁸⁴ This does not mean that these categories taken from Hegel's *Logic* belong to a realm of timeless validity, but they expose themselves historically as elements of an objectivity that can be experienced. It cannot be stated *a priori* what is essence and what is appearance. Thus the exchange of commodities begins on the boundaries of naturally evolved communities, and is thus something relatively accidental, unessential. Later he lays bare the structure of the essence of the capitalist society. Things are similar with trading capital, which, being the oldest form of capital, forms the historical basis also of industrial capital and whose sphere is reduced to that of (objective) illusion once bourgeois conditions have developed.

The difference between appearance and essence thus does not mean that essence is a kind of "world behind the world" as Nietzsche¹⁸⁵ mockingly put it. On the contrary, the appearance has a life of its own and is by no means indifferent to the essence, but itself a concrete determination of this essence. In other words: only by way of the progressive analysis of appearances manifesting themselves objectively can their progressive essence be comprehended – an essence always, however, bound to objects. Thus the essence of the price of products is the value that finds its expression in it. By determining the value we recognize that side of the product that is the ground for its price, without recognition of which this could not be comprehended as the form of appearance of value.

Marx's identification of scientific method with the distinction between surface and law, appearance and essence causes him to choose two aims against which he directs his polemics: classical economy on the one hand and "vulgar economy" that started with Say¹⁸⁶ on the other. To the classical economists especially to Ricardo, he concedes that, although their point of view is determined by the class they belong to, so that they regard capitalist production as provided by nature and unchangeable, they nevertheless attempted to establish its "inner connections"¹⁸⁷ in a systematic way. Ricardo forces science to account for "this contradiction between the apparent and the actual movement of the system". And Marx concludes his appraisal of Ricardo and his importance in the history of economic dogma by stressing "the fact that Ricardo discovers and proclaims the economic contradiction between the classes – as shown by the intrinsic relations – and hence the historical struggle and process of development is grasped at its roots and disclosed in economic science"¹⁸⁸.

On the other hand, "vulgar" economy – that is all economy after the dissolution of Ricardo's school, never escapes from the "apparent connection", falling into the worst excesses of coarse empiricism such as the belief in an ideological consciousness¹⁸⁹. "The vulgar economist", Marx says, "has not the faintest idea that the actual everyday exchange relations need not be directly identical with the magnitudes of value . . . And then the vulgar economist thinks he has made a great discovery, when, as against the disclosures of the inner connection, he proudly claims that in appearance things look different. In fact, he is boasting that he holds fast to the appearance and takes it for the last word. Why, then, any science at all?"¹⁹⁰

Marx's analysis aims at defining economic phenomena in their pure form and freed from disturbing incidental circumstances. As, above all, Henryk Grossman has shown in his book *Das Akkumulations- und Zusammenbruchsgesetz des kapitalistischen Systems*¹⁹¹, this requires some simplifying

assumptions, such as for example constant prices, a state of balance of capitalist mechanism, a coinciding of prices and values and an ignoring of competition and foreign trade. Marx wants to regard phenomena in their "legitimate form that corresponds to their concepts"¹⁹², and he suggests the following procedure: "If prices actually differ from values, we must, first of all, reduce the former to the latter, in other words, treat the difference as accidental in order that the phenomena may be observed in their purity."¹⁹³ The law of values can only be properly developed if we abstract from the fluctuations in supply and demand, from which vulgar economy that was rooted in circulation wanted to derive value.

This does, however, not mean that Marx stopped short at this – however methodically necessary – reduction of the variety of market phenomena to the process of production as a value-forming phenomenon. His interest is of a strictly dialectical nature: the spheres of circulation and production are not "ontological" layers of reality. After Marx has started from the first everyday immediacy of the world of products and, in the first volume of *Das Kapital* has reached the point of their mediation in the process of production, he returns, in the second volume, to the process of circulation as a sphere mediating, for its part, the process of production (*qua* process of reproduction), in order finally, in the third volume, to analyse the total process of capitalist production, i. e. the unity of the processes of production and circulation. Thus the analysis of bourgeois conditions approaches "step by step the form in which these conditions occur on the surface of society, in the action of various capitals on one another, in competition and in the everyday consciousness of the agents of production themselves"¹⁹⁴. Without prejudice to the objective priority of the law of values Marx shows, how production prices, as transformed values, in their turn influence the formation of values: "Both, the immediate process of production and the process of circulation, constantly merge with one another and interpenetrate, thus forever falsifying their own distinctive characteristics . . . The immediate production process itself is only a tiny factor, constantly passing over into the circulation process, just as this passes over into the production process."¹⁹⁵ Thus, the contention that there is a (formal-logical) contradiction between the first and the second volume of *Das Kapital*, a contention frequently made in literature on economy, does not comply with the facts. The non-identity of appearance and essence which is constitutive of Marx's concept of knowledge, is not a characteristic of society as such but of the stage of its fully developed production of goods. Pre-capitalist forms of government are easier to see through for the reason that they are not "abstract", but are based on personal dependencies. When labour products

become goods, they acquire an appearance of things: what really belongs to them as products of social labour, appears as a natural quality, and "the relation of the producers to the sum total of their labour . . . as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour"¹⁹⁶. Marx then develops the idea how the fetishism of goods is enhanced at the transition from the sphere of production to that of circulation. In so far as capital is being considered in the process of production, it remains more or less clear "that it is an instrument for fishing for outside labour. This may be 'rightful' or 'unrightful', justified or unjustified, but the relationship of capitalist to worker is here always imputed"¹⁹⁷. Conditions become much more confused at the transition to the process of circulation, where it is not "capital and labour" that confront one another, "but capital and capital on the one hand and buyer and seller on the other"¹⁹⁸. As buyer and seller of labour they carry out an exchange of equivalents under a legal form "which is alien to the content and merely mystifies it. The content is that the capitalist always exchanges part of the already capitalized outside labour (which he always appropriates without equivalent payment) for a larger quantity of living outside labour"¹⁹⁹. Here it must be considered that this equivalence of non-equivalent elements is inherent in the procedure of exchange as such and has nothing whatever to do with the moral or psychological qualities of those carrying out the exchange. These material questions alone allow an analysis of the special quality of Marx's concept of critical knowledge. Marx has not, it is true, written a logic or epistemology in the traditional sense, a fact that Lenin emphasized in his reading of Hegel, but he has written the strictly objective dialectic of *Das Kapital*, whose wealth in philosophically relevant insights and problems has so far by no means been exploited.

- his works are *Die Buddenbrooks*; *Königliche Hoheit* (Royal Highness); *Der Zauberberg* (The Magic Mountain); *Joseph und seine Brüder* (Joseph and his Brethren); *Dr. Faustus* (Doctor Faustus); *Der Tod in Venedig* (Death in Venice).
- 156 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 1833-1911: Originator of a scientifically founded philosophy of life. Advocate of the epistemological and methodical independence of the humanities as compared to the natural sciences.
- 157 The probable reason for this is that Marx did not want to be confused with Comte. Lenin was the first to speak of historical materialism as "scientific sociology" in his famous polemic of 1894 against the "subjective method". Cf. "What the friends of the people are and how they fight the Social-Democrats", *Collected Works*, vol. I, Lawrence & Wishart, 1960, pp. 129-332.
- 158 Marx/Engels, *Werke*, vol. 26.2, Berlin 1967, p. 112, cf. also p. 113. [Translator's own translation].
- 159 Malthus, Thomas Robert, 1766-1834: English economist, founder of the theory of population (Malthusianism). Advocated late marriage and birth control as means to avoid the distress bound to result from a too rapid growth in population.
- 160 *Das Kapital*, vol. I, Berlin 1955, p. 7 f. Translation taken from Karl Marx, *Capital*, translated from the third German edition by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling and edited by Frederick Engels, London 1912, p. XIX.
- 161 Cf. his book *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, New York 1962.
- 162 Marx was himself fully aware of this state of affairs—not unusual in philosophy. In the letter to Lassalle of May 31st, 1858, he recalls his own doctoral dissertation, the aim of which was to piece together from Epicurus' fragmentary writings his philosophy as a "total system"—a system which in Marx's own conviction only existed *an sich* in Epicurus' writings, but not in a consciously systemized form. Significantly he adds: "Even in the case of philosophers who have given a systematic form to their work, e.g. Spinoza, the real inner structure of this system is quite different from the form in which it has been consciously presented." (Cf. Marx/Engels, *Werke*, vol. 29, Berlin 1963, p. 561 [Translator's own translation].) Any interpretation of *Das Kapital* will have to stand or fall by this idea.
- 163 *Das Kapital*, vol. I, 1.c., p. 18.
- 164 Cf. Marx's correspondence with Engels, Lassalle and Kugelmann in the years 1858 to 1870. For Hegel's importance for economic analysis, cf. also Lenin, *Werke*, vol. 38, Berlin 1964, p. 316.
- 165 See p. 201.
- 166 Letter to Lassalle of February 22nd, 1858, in Marx/Engels, *Werke*, vol. 29, 1.c., p. 550.
- 167 Petty, Sir William, 1623-1685: English economist. His views on population increase, division of labour and finance mark him out as a predecessor of classical national economy and as a founder of social statistics.
- 168 Ricardo, David, 1772-1823: English economist, advocate of economic liberalism.
- 169 "True theory", Marx wrote to Dageobert Oppenheim on August 25th, 1842, "must be unfolded and made clear within concrete circumstances and on the evidence of existing conditions." (Marx/Engels, *Werke*, vol. 27, Berlin 1963, p. 409 [translator's own translation].)
- 170 *Das Elend der Philosophie*, Berlin 1952, p. 129 f. [Translator's own translation.]
- 171 Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie", vol. 3, in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 19, Glockner, Stuttgart 1959, p. 284. [English translation taken from: G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philo-*

- sophy, translated by E.S. Haldane and F.H. Simson, 3 vols., London 1892-5, vol. III, p. 176.]
- 172 *Das Kapital*, vol. I, 1. c., p. 17 [Moore-Aveling translation (see note 3), p. XXIX-XXX]. This distinction between "inquiry" and "presentation" has its counterpart in *Theorien über den Mehrwert* as a distinction between "analysis" and "genetic presentation". Here we find: "Analysis . . . is a necessary prerequisite for genetic presentation, of the process of grasping the real process of formation in its various phases" [translator's own translation].
- 173 Cf. the publications of the Althusser school in Paris, with their structuralist orientation, especially the compilation *Lire le Capital*, so far in two volumes, Paris 1965. Particularly important contributions to this compilation are Jacques Rancière's study 'Le concept de critique et la critique de l'économie politique des "Manuscrits" de 1844 au "Capital"' (vol. I, pp. 95-210) and Louis Althusser's 'L'objet du Capital' (vol. II, pp. 9-185). Cf. also for the concept of presentation my own essay 'Zum Verhältnis von Geschichte und Natur im dialektischen Materialismus' in *Existentialismus und Marxismus*, Frankfurt/Main 1965, especially pp. 127-131.
- 174 Marx/Engels, *Werke*, vol. 3, Berlin 1962, cf. p. 27.
- 175 *Ibid.* p. 38.
- 176 Max Horkheimer, 'Zum Rationalismustreit in der gegenwärtigen Philosophie', *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* 23, Paris 1934, No. 1, p. 22.
- 177 Cf. his letter to Lassalle of February 22nd, 1858, in Marx/Engels, *Ausgewählte Briefe*, Berlin 1953, p. 123.
- 178 Letter to Lassalle of November 12th, 1858, in Marx/Engels, *Werke*, vol. 29, 1. c., p. 567 [translator's own translation].
- 179 Letter to Lassalle of February 22nd, 1858, *ibid.* p. 550 [translator's own translation].
- 180 See discussion, p. 126.
- 181 *Das Kapital*, vol I, 1. c., p. 81 [Moore-Aveling translation (see note 3), p. 47].
- 182 Lefebvre, Henri François, born 1905: from 1944 to 1949 worked for French radio, from 1949 to 1961 scientific director at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, at present professor of sociology in the Faculty of Arts at Strasbourg. Author of numerous books on Marxism, among them *Le Materialisme Dialectique*, *Pour Connaitre la Pensée de Marx et le Marxisme*.
- 183 *Das Kapital*, vol. III, Berlin 1953, p. 870 [translator's own translation].
- 184 *Ibid.* p. 344 [translator's own translation].
- 185 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 1844-1900: Philosopher. Opponent of Christianity and democracy, he tried to create a new system of values, substituting a "master-morality" for the prevalent "slave-morality", an acceptance of this world for a belief in the next. Basic ideas: the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same and the concept of the superman. Principle works: *Also sprach Zarathustra* (Thus spoke Zarathustra); *Der Wille zur Macht*; *Ecce Homo*.
- 186 Say, Jean-Baptiste, 1767-1832: French economist, founder of the French school of free trade. Propagated the ideas of Adam Smith and David Ricardo in France.
- 187 *Theorien über den Mehrwert* (Marx/Engels, *Werke*, vol. 26.2, 1. c., p. 162); cf. Karl Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value*, selections translated by G. A. Bonner and Emile Burns, New York 1952, p. 203.
- 188 *Ibid.* p. 163 [Bonner-Burns translation (see note 23), p. 203-4].
- 189 This is always linked with classificatory concepts concerned with scope or extent, whereas Marx explicitly sets the dialectical method over against the subsumption of a mass

- of cases under a general principle (cf. his letter to Engels of December 12th, 1861, in Marx Engels, *Werke*, vol. 30, Berlin 1964, p. 207). The "concept" is for Marx a generalist, whose historical concretion does not diminish, but is increased as the level of abstraction increases. This is to be seen at the point where magnitude of value becomes form of value. "The value-form of the labour-product is the most abstract but also the most general form of bourgeois production, which is thus characterized as a special kind of social production and thus at the same time as historical." In *Das Kapital*, vol. I, l. c., p. 86. Cf. for the Marxian method as critic of ideology my article "Ideologie und Anspruch auf Wissenschaftlichkeit" in *Periodikum für wissenschaftlichen Sozialismus*, 6, Munich 1960, pp. 59-66.
- 190 Letter to Kugelmann of July 11th, 1868, Marx/Engels, *Werke*, vol. 32, Berlin 1965, p. 533. [English translation: Karl Marx, *Letters to Dr. Kugelmann*, translated by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, London n.d., p. 74.]
- 191 Leipzig 1929.
- 192 *Das Kapital*, vol. III, l. c., p. 216.
- 193 *Das Kapital*, vol. I, l. c., p. 173, footnote 37 [Moore-Aveling translation (see note 3), p. 144, footnote 1].
- 194 *Das Kapital*, vol. III, l. c., p. 47 [translator's own translation].
- 195 *Ibid.* p. 64 [translator's own translation].
- 196 *Das Kapital*, vol. I, l. c., p. 77 [Moore-Aveling translation (see note 3), p. 43].
- 197 *Theorien über den Mehrwert*, part 3, Berlin 1962, p. 452 [translator's own translation].
- 198 *Das Kapital*, vol. III, l. c., p. 64 [translator's own translation].
- 199 *Das Kapital*, vol. I, l. c., p. 612 [translator's own translation].
- 200 Freud, Sigmund, 1856-1939: Founder of psychoanalysis.
- 201 Babbitt: name for the American bourgeois who strictly adheres to the social and ethical standards of his group (from Sinclair Lewis' novel *Babbitt*, published in 1922).
- 202 Bertolt Brecht, 1898-1956: German author of poems, songs, dramas and theoretical writings on the theatre.
- 203 Kautsky, Karl, 1854-1938: socialist politician and theoretician. Co-author of the Erfurt Programme (1891) of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany.
- 204 Tillich, Paul, 1886-1965: theologian (philosophy of religion and social ethics). Among his works are *Masse und Geist*, 1922; *Kirche und Entscheidung*, 1933; *Der Protestantismus*, 1950 (The Protestant Era); *Theology of Culture*, 1959.
- 205 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 1788-1860: German philosopher. For him the essence of the world is a will without cause or aim which in the phenomenal world objectivizes itself as the will to live and to reproduce. On higher levels it is able to recognize itself as unreasonable and bad and thus to redeem itself. This occurs in the disinterested contemplation of works of art. Complete redemption is only achieved by him who negates the will to live (here Schopenhauer is influenced by Buddhism). His main work is *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (The World as Will and Idea).
- 206 Rahner, Karl, born 1904: Jesuit, dogmatician. Author of among other works *Geist in Welt*, 1939 and *Schriften zur Theologie*, 2 vols., 1954-55.
- 207 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von, 1646-1716: German philosopher, mathematician, lawyer, historian and statesman. From 1700 President of the newly founded Academy of Sciences in Berlin. His main ideas are incorporated in his